Paul Blackburn: Rotten Eggs: The Case of the Missing Hydrogen Sulfide in Satartia, Mississippi
Rotten Eggs: The Case of the Missing Hydrogen Sulfide in Satartia, Mississippi
by Paul Blackburn, Bold Alliance
July 18, 2024
Summit Carbon Solutions and the ethanol industry argue that ruptures of ethanol-based carbon dioxide pipelines will not have the same health impacts as the February 22, 2020, rupture of a Denbury carbon dioxide pipeline near Satartia, Mississippi, because, according to them, the carbon dioxide in the Denbury pipeline was contaminated with hydrogen sulfide, whereas the carbon dioxide that would be captured at ethanol plants is not. They claim that it was the hydrogen sulfide that harmed the people of Satartia, and not the carbon dioxide.
As evidence for their claim, they state that the source of the carbon dioxide transported by Denbury pipeline is the Jackson Dome, an underground natural source of carbon dioxide known to be contaminated with an average of 5 percent hydrogen sulfide (50,000 parts per million), as well as an average of 5 percent natural gas. H2S concentrations as high as 35 percent have been reported. The fact that the carbon dioxide in the Jackson Dome is contaminated with hydrogen sulfide is well known. See, for example, the report by the National Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL), entitled Subsurface Sources of CO2 in the Contiguous United States, and specifically the chart on page 6 and the narrative description on page 32. Also, news reports stated that the Satartia residents reported a rotten eggs odor, which is what hydrogen sulfide smells like.
Yet, air quality monitoring data collected by a Denbury contractor using equipment rated to detect hydrogen sulfide levels as low as 0.1 ppm failed to show any hydrogen sulfide. This data is contained on pdf pages 8 and 256 of the federal Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) Failure Investigation Report (FIV) for the Satartia rupture. All 85 outdoor readings and all 18 indoor readings were below the detection limit and recorded as “0”.
Where did the hydrogen sulfide go? It’s a mystery! Grab your magnifying glass, notebook and join me in solving the case of the missing hydrogen sulfide.
The First Stage of Our Investigation: Science!
Sherlock Holmes relied on science for many of his investigations. He even had a chemistry laboratory in his home! Following his lead, the first step in our investigation is to learn more about hydrogen sulfide: what is it, what does it do to people and animals, how does it affect pipeline safety, and how can it be controlled? Let’s go sleuthing!
Hydrogen sulfide is a molecule made up of one sulfur atom and two hydrogen atoms, kind of like this: H-S-H. Its abbreviation is H2S. The U.S. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) describes H2S as a “colorless gas with a strong odor of rotten eggs.” It is flammable and may explode when its concentration in the air is between 4 and 44 percent. H2S is relatively common. It causes the rotten egg smell in swamps, sewers, and confined animal feeding operations. It is produced in small amounts by bacteria in human mouths and digestive tracts. It is produced in large amounts by petroleum refineries, natural gas plants, petrochemical plants, coke oven plants, food processing plants, tanneries, wastewater treatment plants, and livestock confinement facilities. According to the USEPA, H2S decomposes in air over time, lasting for as little as one day in the summer and up to 42 days in the winter. The USEPA also says that it does not cause cancer.
According to U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), as concentration in the air increases H2S causes the following progressively worse symptoms:
| H2S Concentration (ppm) | Symptoms/Effects |
| 0.00011-0.00033 | Typical background concentrations |
| 0.01-1.5 | Odor threshold range. Odor becomes more offensive at 3-5 ppm. Above 30 ppm, odor described as sweet or sickeningly sweet. An Iowa State study found that the average “recognition threshold” for smelling H2S is 0.047 ppm. |
| 2-5 | Prolonged exposure may cause nausea, tearing of the eyes, headaches or loss of sleep. Airway problems (bronchial constriction) in some asthma patients. |
| 20 | Prolonged exposure may cause possible fatigue, loss of appetite, headache, irritability, poor memory, dizziness. |
| 50-100 | Slight conjunctivitis (pink eye) and respiratory tract irritation after 1 hour. May cause digestive upset and loss of appetite. |
| 100 | Coughing, eye irritation, loss of smell after 2-15 minutes (olfactory fatigue). Altered breathing, drowsiness after 15-30 minutes. Throat irritation after 1 hour. Gradual increase in severity of symptoms over several hours. Death may occur after 48 hours. |
| 100-150 | Loss of smell (olfactory fatigue or paralysis). |
| 200-300 | Marked conjunctivitis (pink eye) and respiratory tract irritation after 1 hour. Pulmonary edema (fluid in the lungs) may occur from prolonged exposure. |
| 500-700 | Staggering, collapse in 5 minutes. Serious damage to the eyes in 30 minutes. Death after 30-60 minutes. |
| 700-1,000 | Rapid unconsciousness, “knockdown” or immediate collapse within 1 to 2 breaths, breathing stops, death within minutes. |
| 1,000-2,000 | Nearly instant death |
To protect workers, NIOSH has established the worker safety exposure limits shown in the following table. This description of the limits may be useful.
| Exposure Limit | Type of Limit |
| 10 ppm | Recommended Exposure Limit: a non-binding limit for maximum H2S exposure concentration over 10 minutes |
| 20 ppm | Average Exposure Limit a legally enforceable limit providing the average level of H2S to which an employee may be exposed during an 8-hour shift |
| 50 ppm | Short-Term Exposure Limit a legally enforceable limit establishing the maximum concentration to which a worker may be exposed for up to 10-minutes over an 8-hour shift |
| 100 ppm | Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health (IDLH) a limit established to (1) ensure that workers can escape from a contaminated environment in the event of failure of respiratory protection equipment; and (2) indicate the concentration above which an employer is legally required to provide a highly reliable breathing apparatus providing maximum worker protection. |
This information indicates that short-term exposures to H2S levels below 20 ppm are generally considered safe for workers, that short-term (10 minute) exposure to concentrations as high as 50 ppm over an 8-hour shift are considered safe, and that any exposure to concentrations higher than 100 ppm are considered immediately dangerous to life or health, because the toxic effects of H2S could prevent a worker from escaping from a contaminated environment.
In addition, the Department of Energy has established Protective Action Criteria (PAC) levels for H2S. PAC-1 is the level at which the general population, including susceptible individuals, could experience discomfort but not be disabled or suffer permanent impacts. PAC-2 is the level above which the general population, including susceptible individuals, could experience irreversible or long-lasting health effects. PAC-3 is the level above which the general population including, susceptible individuals, could experience life-threatening affects after one hour. The DOE set PAC-1 at 0.51 ppm, PAC-2 at 27 ppm, and PAC-3 at 50 ppm (pdf page 127). These levels are contained in the Failure Investigation Report at pdf page 265. These limits are more conservative than but generally consistent with OSHA standards.
H2S is highly corrosive to steel pipelines and other oil and gas industry equipment. H2S is incompatible with metals because it forms an acid in the presence of oxygen and CO2. The corrosivity of H2S can reduce the service life of pipelines and oil and gas production and processing facilities. The USEPA found that H2S exposure has caused infrastructure designed to last 50 to 100 years to fail in as little as 10 to 20 years, due to corrosion. It is estimated that 40 percent of all corrosion in the oil and gas industry is due to “sour” (acid) corrosion and that H2S is the main compound that leads to this. Since H2S is common in oil and natural gas fields, it is typically removed from produced oil and natural gas to meet safety, commercial, and transportation concentration limits. Carbon dioxide mixed with high levels of H2S may not be usable in enhanced oil recovery operations due to its corrosion impacts and acidification of produced oil, depending on commercial standards. One study showed that the increased acidity caused by high levels of H2S may actually increase the amount of oil recovered. However, any positive benefit of H2S in oil recovery volume would need to be weighed against the adverse economic impacts of acidifying the produced oil and the cost of increased corrosion.
A number of technologies to remove H2S from CO2 are commercially available. A description of these technologies is contained in a screening study commissioned by Denbury to investigate the costs of commercially available technologies to remove H2S from Jackson Dome CO2. The study noted that some of Denbury’s streams are “almost pure CO2,” whereas some streams may be only 70 percent CO2. This is consistent with reports stating that Jackson Dome CO2 contains an average of 5 percent CO2. Apparently, Denbury sought to reduce H2S levels in the CO2 it transports by pipeline to 10 ppm or less for health and safety reasons and wanted a tool to help it determine the relative costs of available H2S removal technologies. The study is undated but it references two other 2009 studies, so must have been written during or after 2009. The study identified three general types of commercially available H2S removal technologies that could be used to remove H2S from Jackson Dome CO2. It noted that “H2S removal technologies have been used in the industry for many years . . . .” Therefore, it appears that Denbury has access to commercially available technology that can remove H2S from its CO2. Whether it has installed such technology in Mississippi, and whether the CO2 released at Satartia was treated to remove H2S, are separate questions.
Captured H2S can be converted into either sulfuric acid or elemental sulfur and sold for industrial purposes. The 2014 National Energy Technology Laboratory study (pages 32 and 46) confirms this and provided a sale price of $142 per ton for elemental sulfur. Therefore, Denbury may have a financial incentive to extract H2S, convert it to a safer chemical, and sell it.
Initial Deductions Based on the Science of Hydrogen Sulfide
Now that we know something about H2S, my dear Watson, what can we deduce? The evidence indicates that:
- People can smell H2S’s rotten egg odor at levels below 1 ppm.
- H2S concentrations below 20 ppm may have minor irritating effects but are generally considered safe for long-term worker exposure.
- H2S concentrations above 20 ppm but less than 100 ppm have health effects, depending on the concentration and length of exposure, but for most people these effects are generally not serious over the short-term.
- H2S threatens life and health at concentrations of 100 ppm or higher, which is the level at which OSHA says self-rescue may become difficult and a respirator is required.
- H2S does not cause people to quickly lose consciousness until concentrations are above 500 ppm, and at that level H2S will kill within 30 to 60 minutes and cause serious eye damage within 30 minutes.
- H2S concentrations above 700 ppm will kill within minutes, and concentrations above 1,000 ppm will kill instantly.
- Jackson Dome, the source of CO2 for the Satartia rupture, is contaminated with an average of 5 percent H2S (50,000 ppm), but some of the CO2 extracted is nearly pure and other CO2 streams are reported to have up to 35 percent H2S.
- Commerically available technologies exist to remove H2S convert it to marketable products.
- Denbury studied technologies to remove H2S from Jackson Dome CO2, and it had multiple reasons to do so, including to prevent corrosion, limit acidification of oil produced by enhanced oil recovery operations, earn money from selling sulfur, and limit liability in the event of accidental releases.
The fact that the Satartia residents smelled rotten eggs does not necessarily mean that the rupture released dangerous levels of H2S, because people can smell it at very low concentrations. The fact that Jackson Dome CO2 has an average H2S concentration of 5 percent (50,000 ppm) does not mean that the CO2 released by the Satartia pipeline rupture contained this much H2S. Denbury could have been transporting naturally pure CO2, or it could have removed H2S using commercially available technology. Moreover, given all of the risks H2S poses to human health and pipeline safety, it seems likely that Denbury either ships CO2 with naturally low H2S levels or removes the H2S prior to transport.
What about evidence that Denbury removes the H2S from its CO2? After a preliminary investigation, I have not found evidence of the actual concentration of H2S at the time of the Satartia rupture, nor have I found evidence directly proving or disproving that Denbury removes H2S from its CO2 before transporting it by pipeline. Due to its corrosion and commercial impacts, Denbury almost certainly tracks H2S concentrations in its CO2, but this doesn’t mean that it publishes this data. We can assume that Denbury has direct evidence of the concentration of H2S released by the Satartia rupture, but it appears that this data is not released to the public.
Also, the fact that something did not happen can help solve a mystery. In Silver Blaze, a case about a missing race horse, Sherlock homes used the fact that a watchdog did not bark to deduce that someone known to the dog stole the horse. Here, the fact that the PHMSA’s Failure Investigation Report acknowledges that H2S may have been in the CO2 but does not discuss H2S concentrations in the pipeline or attribute any health impacts to H2S suggests that PHMSA determined that H2S was not present in the pipeline at dangerous levels. It is reasonable to assume that during its investigation PHMSA asked Denbury about H2S concentration in the pipeline at the time of the rupture and determined that H2S concentration was not high enough to cause health effects, and so did not address H2S impacts in its Failure Investigation Report. If H2S was present at dangerous concentrations, it would have been inappropriate for PHMSA to entirely fail to investigate H2S concentration in the pipeline and discuss its health impacts. If H2S concentrations were high enough to cause health impacts, PHMSA should have barked. But it didn’t.
The Second Stage of Our Investigation: Examination of Evidence Related to Post Rupture H2S Monitoring
Now that we have learned about H2S, let’s get out our magnifying glasses and do a close inspection of the evidence related to air quality testing following the Satartia rupture. According to the PHMSA Failure Investigation Report, Denbury and/or the Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) contacted the Center for Toxicology & Environmental Health (CTEH, LLC), an environmental, health and safety consulting group, at 7:58 PM, less than an hour after the rupture, to provide air quality monitoring services. At 10:30 PM, CTEH personnel arrived on-scene and started monitoring for CO2, H2S, and oxygen levels, over three hours after the rupture but during the time that the pipeline was actively venting. CTEH conducted monitoring until 11:34 AM the following day.
The full CTEH air quality monitoring report is attached to PHMSA’s Failure Investigation Report (pdf page 253). CTEH measured H2S concentrations 85 times outdoors and 18 times inside homes. It detected concentrations of CO2 as high as 26,000 ppm (2.6%) outdoors, and 28,000 ppm (2.8%) indoors, but detected no H2S outdoors or indoors within the detection limits of its calibrated H2S monitoring equipment. This equipment was rated to measure H2S concentrations as low as 0.1 ppm. PHMSA Failure Investigation Report at pdf pages 8 and 256.
This being said, CTEH’s outdoor testing was conducted almost exclusively along Highway 3 and in the village of Satartia itself, with the closest measurement location being about half a mile west of the rupture site. Many test locations were much further away, as far as approximately 2 miles to the southwest and approximately 11 miles to the north. Failure Investigation Report at pdf page 268. CTEH did not attempt to take measurements closer to the rupture site.
All of the indoor test locations were within Sataria, approximately one mile from the rupture site. Fewer samples were taken because CTEH did not enter properties without owner approvals. Also, it likely conducted all of its tests after the evacuation order was lifted at 8:00 AM the following morning and law enforcement allowed residents to return to their homes.
The relatively late arrival of CTEH (10:30 PM) combined with the fact that it did not attempt to take readings closer than about half a mile from the rupture site likely resulted in CO2 and H2S concentration measurements below maximum concentrations nearer in time to the actual rupture and directly in the plume path. Nonetheless, if maximum measured CO2 outdoor concentrations were 26,000 ppm and H2S levels are assumed to constitute 5 percent of the pipeline’s contents, then proportionate levels of H2S would have been as high as 1,300 ppm – well above the level that would have instantly killed anyone exposed. The Failure Investigation Report also shows that CTEH recorded CO2 levels inside homes in Satartia as high as 28,000 ppm – higher than its highest outdoor reading. Since CTEH did not enter residents homes in Satartia without their permission, and residents were not allowed to return to their homes until 8:00 AM the morning after the rupture, it is likely that CO2 concentrations in Satartia were much higher soon after the rupture. Since nobody in Satatria died or had symptoms such as severe eye or lung damage, it does not appear that H2S concentrations in the pipeline were anywhere near 5 percent.
One possible reason why some of CTEH’s samples contained no H2S was likely due to their being taken too far away. However, it did take many outdoor samples closer to the rupture site and within the village of Satartia where residents smelled rotten eggs, such that it did take a substantial number of samples within the plume area. If injury-causing H2S levels, say above 100 ppm, existed in Satartia, then some of the testing along Highway 3 and within Satartia should have detected at least residual levels of H2S – but it didn’t.
It is also possible that H2S dissipated faster than the CO2, because while H2S is heavier than air, it is lighter than CO2. Air has a density of 1.00; H2S has a density of 1.177; and CO2 has a relative density of 1.52. Therefore, it is possible that some of the H2S may have risen into the atmosphere more quickly than the CO2. However, H2S is heavier than air so would also remain near the ground, and the Satartia residents smelled rotten eggs, so some amount of H2S was in the CO2 plume. Even if we assume, arguendo, that a substantial proportion of an assumed 5 percent H2S dissipated faster than the CO2, it would seem unlikely that CTEH would have failed to detect H2S in any of its readings.
Thus, while not as extensive as we might have liked, the CTEH air monitoring data supports a conclusion that H2S concentrations in the pipe at the time of rupture were not at or near 5 percent. Instead, the fact that CTEH detected no H2S suggests that H2S concentration in the pipeline were likely very low even during the peak of the rupture, because H2S concentrations would drop to zero at the time and locations of the air quality monitoring only if the highest transient concentrations in the plume were relatively low – enough to smell but not enough to cause the symptoms observed in the Satartia victims, including unconsciousness and disorientation.
Cracking the Case of the Missing Hydrogen Sulfide
Do we have enough evidence to definitively solve the case on the missing H2S? Frankly, no, because it is likely that only Denbury or possibly PHMSA have direct evidence of the amount of H2S in the pipeline at the time of the rupture. Denbury probably monitors H2S concentrations on an ongoing basis for safety and commercial reasons, but has chosen not to release this information to the public. It is also possible that Denbury provided this information to PHMSA, and PHMSA also chose not to release it.
What can we conclude about the claim by Summit and the ethanol industry that Denbury’s pipeline contained 5 percent H2S? This claim appears to be based on an assumption that Denbury was transporting raw CO2 from the Jackson Dome formation with its average 5 percent H2S without any treatment to remove H2S. The following evidence indicates that this assumption is not reasonable:
- The CTEH air monitoring detected no H2S at or above 0.1 ppm, despite conducting 85 outdoor and 18 indoor samples, some as near as one-half mile from the rupture site.
- If H2S concentration in the pipeline had been 5 percent H2S, it is likely that the plume from the rupture would have contained H2S concentrations in and near Stataria of up to 1,300 ppm – high enough to kill or at least cause serious eye and lung injuries, but no such injuries or deaths were reported.
- Some of the Jackson Dome formation CO2 is nearly pure containing low levels of H2S, so it is possible that the CO2 in the pipeline was from a low H2S source; and
- Denbury may have removed the H2S from its CO2 using commercially available technology, because it had the following multiple incentives to do so:
- Denbury was reported seeking to reduced H2S concentration to 10 ppm or less for commercial and health and safety reasons;
- Denbury had a financial incentive to capture the H2S and convert it to elemental sulfur, a marketable commodity; and
- Denbury had a liability incentive to reduce H2S levels in its CO2 to avoid putting large numbers of people at risk of death in the event of a pipeline rupture, which could result in a single accident bankrupting the company.
Taken together, the argument that the injuries resulting from the Satartia rupture were caused primarily by H2S and not be CO2 appear to have no foundation other than the unreasonable assumption that the pipeline was transporting untreated CO2 with H2S at average Jackson Dome levels.
Hopefully, further investigation will discover the actual concentration of H2S at the time of the rupture, confirm that Denbury has installed H2S removal technology, or learn more about Denbury’s commercial standards for H2S concentrations. If you have time, why don’t you dig into this yourself? The evidence is out there.
In the meantime, don’t believe Summit or the ethanol industry’s argument that the Satartia residents were harmed by H2S and not CO2. The health impacts suffered by the Satartia residents are fully consistent with those resulting from exposure to high levels of CO2 and do not appear to be caused by high H2S concentrations. The Satartia rupture presents a stark reminder of the danger of living near a CO2 pipeline, no matter how pure the CO2 may be.